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European Court of Justice: a shamefaced 
system of precedent? 
In view of the forthcoming accession of Hungary to the European Union, Act 
XXX of 2003 amended both Act III of 1952 (Code of Civil Procedure) and Act 
XIX of 1998 (Code of Criminal Procedure). Among others, the amendment 
incorporates the preliminary ruling procedure into our law of procedure and 
establishes the procedural conditions of preliminary reference. The legal effect 
of the decisions of the European Court of Justice is also dwelt upon in the 
Explanation attached to the proposal for this amendment. The Explanation 
makes two references to the fact that preliminary rulings by the European Court 
of Justice have a binding force beyond the concrete case:' 
"Therefore the legal interpretation of the Court shall be binding not only 
on the court proceeding in the given case but it shall also be governing in 
future cases which have similar facts of the case and legal questions... 
All the elements of the ruling made by the European Court of Justice 
shall be binding, its force shall cover not only the legal relationship 
concerned in the procedure but also the legal relationships established 
before the decision. Consequently, preliminary ruling has a retroactive 
force." 
The Explanation intended to support these statements by citing the Da Costa 
and CILFIT cases.' 
It is a widely disputed question to what extent the preliminary 	of the 
Court of Justice containing legal interpretation are binding beyond the case 
from which the reference was made. As far as I know the Court has never 
declared anywhere that preliminary rulings containing legal interpretation are 
binding for everybody, and the examples quoted in the Explanation are not 
' Explanation, General part, points I.3.3 and I.6. 
2  Case 28-30/62. Da Costa en Schaake NV, Jacob Meijer NV, Hoechst-Holland NV v 
Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration. [1963] ECR 0061., Case 283/81. Srl CILFIT and 
Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health. [1982] ECR 3415. 
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suitable for supporting this view. In the quoted cases the Court only stated that 
its decisions have a legal effect beyond the concrete case, but it did not state 
that this legal effect entails the obligation to follow these decisions in general. 
The content of the legal effect is rather that in similar cases national courts can 
base their decisions on the previous statements of the European Court of 
Justice, and that they are exempt from the duty to refer if the Court has already 
made a preliminary ruling in a similar case. 
On the other hand, the domestic law can prescribe that the judgments of the 
Court are to be followed by the national courts. This was essentially done in the 
United Kingdom in Section 3(1) of the European Communities Act (1972):' 
"For the purposes of all legal proceedings any question as to the meaning 
or effect of any of the Treaties, or as to the validity, meaning or effect of 
any Community instrument, shall be treated as a question of law (and, if 
not referred to the European Court, be for determination as such in 
accordance with the principles laid down by and any relevant decision of 
the European Court or any court attached thereto). " 
In other Member States not the legal rules but superior national courts allude 
that the decisions of the European Court of Justice have a binding force beyond 
the concrete case. Such statements were made, for example, by the French Cour 
de Cassation, the German Bundesgerichtshof (federal supreme court), 
Bundesverfalungsgericht (constitutional court) and Bundesverwaltungsgericht 
(federal administrative court), and the Belgian Cour de Cassation. 4 
The question arises whether the contents of the Explanation can be regarded 
as implying that the Hungarian law-maker considers it compulsory for the 
Hungarian courts to follow preliminary rulings with legal interpretation beyond 
the concrete case? This question will be answered only by the practice after the 
accession, but in this context the practice of the European Union is worth 
examining. 
Nature of preliminary ruling 
Community legal rules are also applied in national courts, and the requirement 
of the uniform application and interpretation of these rules has to be ensured 
and met under these circumstances, too. The basic means for promoting the 
uniform application of Community law is the preliminary ruling procedure, 
which is a specific procedure for the co-operation between the European Court 
of Justice and national courts in order to ensure the uniform interpretation and 
application of Community legal rules. Although several provisions of the 
' See also section 3(1) of the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act (1990) 
4 LASOK, K.P.E.: Law and Institutions of the European Union. Reed Elsevir 2001. p. 356. 
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European Union regulate preliminary ruling, Article 234 of the EC Treaty is of 
the greatest importance. The essence of the procedure is that after the reference 
made by a national court, in light of the concrete case to be decided, the 
European Court of Justice may make a preliminary ruling about the 
interpretation of EC Treaty and also about the validity and interpretation of 
secondary Community acts. 
The emphasis is laid on uniform interpretation and application as well as on 
the co-operation between national courts and the Court of Justice as it has been 
pointed out by the European Court of Justice on countless occasions since the 
Schwarze case in 1965. 5 The preliminary ruling procedure embodies a 
continuous dialogue between the European Court of Justice and the national 
courts with respect to delimiting the scope of Community law. 
In this context the question arises: to what extent the preliminary ruling 
made by the European Court of Justice is binding in the cases heard by national 
courts. This question may come up because Community law does not regulate 
this issue, and the European Court of Justice has also made only few 
unambiguous statements. At any rate, a few distinctions have to be made in 
order to delimit the subject. It is essential whether preliminary ruling is about 
interpretation or invalidity. It is similarly vital whether the we speak about the 
effect exerted on the concrete case leading to preliminary ruling or about its 
influence on other cases. 
Based on the case law of the Court some general statements can already be 
made. 
Rulings both on interpretation and invalidity are binding on the referring 
court — but it has the possibility to make a new reference in the same case. This 
proposition was made unequivocal by the Court quite early. 6 
Rulings both on interpretation and invalidity are also binding on other 
courts proceeding in the given case — but they have the possibility to make a 
new reference in the same case. 
Preliminary ruling is binding not only on the referring court but also on the 
court of appeal proceeding in the same case. This can be inferred from the 
Court's statements and reasons made in connection with the binding force of 
the preliminary ruling on the referring court.' The legal practice of national 
courts shares this opinion in several Member States.' 
5  Case 16/65. Schwarze v Einfuhr- and Vorratsstelle Getreide. [1965] ECR 0877. 
6  E.g. Case 29/68. Mitch-, Fett- and Eierkontor GmbH v Hauptzollamt Saarbrücken. [1969] 
ECR 165. par. 2., followed in Case 52/76. Luigi Benedetti v Munari F.IIi s.a.s. [1977] ECR 0163. 
par. 26., Case 69/85. Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft GmbH & Co. v Federal Republic of Germany. 
[ 1986] ECR 0947. par. 13. 
' Joined Cases C-143/88 and C-92/89. Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen AG v Hauptzollamt 
Itzehoe and Zuckerfabrik Soest GmbH v Hauptzollamt Paderborn. [1991] ECR 0477., par. 52. 
8 ANDERSON, D.W.K. — DEMETRIOU, M.: References to the European Court. London 2002. p. 
326. 
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— A preliminary ruling has to be followed by everybody in case the Court 
states the invalidity of a Community legal norm. 
If these decisions did not have an objective nature and normative force, an 
absurd situation would arise. In spite of this the Court has not expressly stated 
the absolute force of these decisions. The reason for this could be that the 
annulment of the norm may be the consequence of the action for annulment 
(Article 230 of the EC Treaty). This removes the norm from the Community 
legal order. On the other hand, the preliminary ruling declaring a rule invalid 
(Article 234 of the EC Treaty) does not annul the norm but prevents the 
application thereof — in the concrete case by all means.' However, there is no 
doubt that the Court of Justice expects the following of the preliminary ruling 
declaring a rule invalid in other cases, too, provided that the court does not take 
the possibility of deciding to refer. 10 
— The Court has not stated expressis verbis that it is compulsory to follow its 
preliminary rulings on interpretation in other cases. There are significant 
differences between preliminary rulings on interpretation or invalidity with 
respect to the nature of their legal effect. It is due to this fact that they cannot 
necessarily be considered in the same manner. 
It is not duly elucidated whether the interpretation constitutes part of the 
interpreted rule and as such has to be followed similarly to the rule itself." If 
so, the interpreting decision has an objective, normative force, if not, its force 
can only be relative. On the other hand, this problem is not encountered in the 
case of decisions declaring invalidity as such decisions deprive the rule of law 
itself of its legal effect, thus, as an absurd consequence, the contesting of the 
objective nature would ruin the principle of legal certainty. 
The national court does not have the right to declare a Community legal rule 
invalid. Therefore it cannot but rely on the decisions of the European Court of 
Justice in this respect. However, the national court can interpret and apply 
Community law on its own right, thus it does not necessarily have to rely on the 
interpreting decisions of Community courts (it can follow these decisions 
without it being evident). As a consequence, the legal practice of Community 
courts may remain latent in questions of interpretation, while in the case of 
decisions declaring invalidity this may not happen. 
9 See e.g. Case C-127/94. The Queen v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex pane 
H. & R. Ecroyd Holdings Ltd and John Rupert Ecroyd. [1996] ECR 1-2731. per AG Léger par. 
74. 
10 Case 66/80. SpA International Chemical Corporation v Amministrazione delle finanze 
dello Stato. [1981] ECR 1191. paras. 12-18., confirmed in Case 112/83. Société des produits de 
mats SA v Administration des douanes et droits indirects. [1985] ECR 0719. par. 16., Case 
314/85. Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost. [1987] ECR 4199. par. 15. 
" Several author holding this viewpoint are referred to by SMIT, H. — HERZOG, P.: The Law of 
the European Community. New York 1999. 177.22(b) 
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Declaring a rule invalid deprives the Community legal regulation of its legal 
effect (whereas in some cases the Court may sustain certain legal effect). The 
legal effect ensuing from the text of the legal rule is described more precisely 
and concretely by the interpretation — thus the interference is much gentler. It 
may be tolerable by a legal system without giving up its basic principles if the 
interpretation of certain legal rules is not entirely the same in different courts. 
However, legal certainty will have to face catastrophic consequences if a 
certain (invalid) regulation or rule of law is once applied, then it is not. It 
follows that much more powerful interests and principles lie behind the 
recognition of the normative force of decisions declaring-a rule invalid than in 
the case of decisions on interpretation, and it is also more compelling from the 
aspect of Community legal order. 
The possible nature of departing from the decision of the Court is also 
different. In the case of preliminary ruling declaring a rule invalid the national 
court itself either considers the Community legal act invalid and thus follows 
the decision, or not. On the other hand, the preliminary ruling on interpretation 
itself also demands interpretation in many cases in the course of its application 
to the given case, thus the borderline between following or not following the 
decision is much wider because of the possible difficulties of interpretation. In 
other words sometimes it may be difficult to say whether the national court 
actually follows the interpretation of the Court by applying the statements 
contained in the preliminary ruling to the concrete case. 
In view of (and as a consequence of) the above it may seem that the 
European Court of Justice takes even more caution in defining the legal force of 
its rulings on interpretation than in the case of preliminary rulings declaring a 
rule invalid. Thus in the following the question is what can be said about the 
legal effect of preliminary rulings on interpretation — first of all from the 
viewpoint of national courts. 
Problems of the legal effect of preliminary ruling 
A question concerning the bases of the given legal system is whether the force 
of the decision of a court covers only the parties involved in the case (relative 
force), or whether the decision has a normative force and covers others or 
everybody within the given legal system, including the court making the 
decision and other courts as well as other persons and entities (erga omnes 
effect). The statutes of international courts do not generally acknowledge the 
normative force of the decisions of courts, their effect beyond the case in 
question. Neither does Community law. This may cause uncertainty in the 
application of law. 
The advocates in favour of the general binding force of preliminary ruling 
have serious arguments, although some of them may be problematic. Today the 
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majority of commentators conclude that the practice of the Court covers 
everybody and support binding force. 12 Similarly, in enforcement actions 
(Articles 226 and 227 of the EC Treaty) concerning judgments with respect to 
defendant Member States views supporting erga omnes and binding force are 
also encountered." 
Undoubtedly, preliminary ruling is meant to ensure the uniform application 
of the law of the European Community in the national courts of the Member 
States. This goal could not be achieved if these decisions did not have a 
normative force, a generally binding effect.'° Moreover, Article 10 of the EC 
Treaty incorporates the principle of solidarity. In accordance with this, Member 
States are obliged to facilitate the fulfilment of Community tasks and may not 
engage in activities which endanger the realisation of the goals of integration. 
This obligation is extended to the national courts as state organs. Some authors 
maintain that from this obligation the following of the decisions of the 
Community courts can be deduced, in which these obligations are manifested 
concretely. 15 
The Court may limit the temporal effect of its preliminary rulings. This 
possibility may suggest a more general, objective effect. 1 ó It would hardly be 
sustainable that a Community legal act or a provision thereof is to be applied in 
one sense in a procedure (in a national court) and in another sense in another 
procedure. This would be opposed to the principles of legal certainty and 
uniform application of law." If the conclusions ensuing from the viewpoint of 
objective force were drawn, a national court could disregard the application of 
an interpretation given in a preliminary ruling only if this court itself would 
also decide to refer and the Court would re-interpret the Community legal norm 
in the given case. 
There are several statements made by the European Court of Justice which, 
in one form or another, refer to the effect of preliminary ruling beyond the 
concrete case (even if no binding force is attributed to this effect by all means). 
12  E. g. JACOBS,F.G.: The Effect of Preliminary Rulings in the National Legal Order. In: 
Article 177 References to the European Court. (Ed.: Andenas, M.) London 1994. p. 30., ISAAC, 
G.: Droit communautaire général. Paris 1996. p. 299., ANDERSON, D.W.K. — DEMETRIOU, M.: 
References to the European Court. London 2002. p. 332., CRAIG, P. — DE BúRCA, G.: EU Law. 
New York 1998. p. 424. 
13  Commentaire Megret. (Louis, J-V. — Vandersanden, G. — Waelbroeck, D. — Waelbroeck, 
M.). Vol 10. Bruxelles 1993. p. 86. 
14 ANDERSON, D.W.K. — DEMETRIOU, M.: References to the European Court. London 2002. p. 
332., SMIT , H. — HERZOG: The Law of the European Community. New York 1999. I77.22(b). 
15 SHAW, J.: Law of the European Union. London 2000. p. 245. 
16 SMIT, H. — HERZOG: The Law of the European Community. New York 1999. 177.22(b), see 
Case 112/83. Société des produits de mats SA v Administration des douanes et droits indirects. 
[ 1985] ECR 0719. par. 17. 
17 Case 66/80. SpA International Chemical Corporation v Amministrazione delle finanze 
dello Stato. [1981] ECR 1191. par. 12. 
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At the same time it is questionable whether such statements made by the Court 
are binding in themselves. 
However, there are several arguments against the effect of preliminary 
rulings beyond the concrete case. The Court of Justice is not bound by its 
previous decisions either. This maintains the possibility that the Court may 
diverge from its statements made in an identical legal question. If the national 
court does not agree with the previous decision, it will rather decide to refer 
than follow the previous decision hoping that the Court will diverge from case 
law. Now and then the Court actually and expressly diverges from its previous 
decisions. 18 
The Court itself declared the limited legal effect of its decisions made not in 
preliminary ruling procedures. Thus, for example, in the early Kalkuhl case, 
which was a personnel case, the Court remarked: "The only persons concerned 
by the legal effects of a judgment of the Court annulling a measure taken by an 
institution are the parties to the action and those persons directly affected by the 
measure which is annulled. Such a judgment can only constitute a new factor 
and cause the periods for bringing appeals to start run afresh as regards those 
parties and persons. " 19 
As regards the following of preliminary rulings made in other cases, national 
courts may find it difficult to identify which part of the decision is binding and 
in what form (in other words what the content of binding force is). 
May preliminary ruling have a normative effect? 
Preliminary ruling as a court decision is suitable for having a normative force 
and objective nature. Court decisions are generally decisions on cases, they are 
related to the given factual background of the case and a legal dispute. 
However, the decision in individual cases and its basis normally points beyond 
the individual nature of the decision. The decision may be based on principles, 
rules, definitions or interpretations of rules which do not or may not ensue 
unambiguously from the positive legal rule or rules applied. In this sense a 
particular decision may be rule-forming, generalising and may become a model 
of decision to be followed beyond the individuality of the case. Individual 
decisions also have a normative character." 
This statement especially applies to preliminary rulings made by 
Community courts. Here, in principle, the Court interprets Community legal 
18  See e.g. Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91. Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard. [ 1993] 
ECR I-6097. par. 16. 
19 Case 47/65. Edith Kalkuhl v European Parliament. [1965] ECR 1251. 
20 BLUTMAN L.: A bírósági határozatok közzététele és az Alkotmány. (The publication of 
judicial decisions and the Constitution). Jura, 2001/2. p. 83. 
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rules more or less independently of the facts of the case referred. Thus the 
opinion manifested in preliminary rulings is less bound by the concrete facts of 
the case and can be much more general than typical court decisions. Therefore 
it can form rules and become a decision model. This is proved by the fact that 
the Court regularly makes references to its previous decisions (not only to 
preliminary rulings), and the parties or interveners, including the Member 
States, do the same in the Court. 21 
In its case law the Court unequivocally states that preliminary rulings on 
interpretation also have a normative force and objective nature. In the Da Costa 
case the Commission proposed to dismiss the reference made by the Dutch 
Tariefcommissie for the reason that a decision had already been made by the 
Court in a similar case in an identical legal question (direct effect of Article 12 
of the EC Treaty). 22 Although the Court dismissed the motion of the 
Commission as in accordance with Article 20 of the Statute it is up to the 
national court to decide whether it is desirable to make a reference for 
preliminary ruling, it pointed out: 
"Although the third paragraph of Article [234] unreservedly requires 
courts or tribunals of a Member State against whose decisions there is no 
judicial remedy under national law — like the Tariefcommissie — to refer 
to the Court every question of interpretation raised before them, the 
authority of an interpretation under Article [234] already given by the 
Court may deprive the obligation of its purpose and thus empty it of its 
substance. Such is the case especially when the question raised is 
materially identical with a question which has already been the subject of 
a preliminary ruling in a similar case." 
This statement means that preliminary ruling has a normative force as legal 
effect is attributed to it by the court in other cases, too. This legal effect means 
that the national court may be exempted from the obligation based on the EC 
Treaty of referring the case to the Court of Justice. It is essential that this legal 
effect is conditional in such a case, too ("may deprive"), but at that time the 
full-scale definition of these conditions was not given by the Court. 
This was only done in the CILFIT case, in which the above were confirmed 
and specified by the Court. 23 These conditions were expounded primarily in 
21 Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93. Brasserie du Pecheur SA v Germany and The Queen v 
Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd. and others. [1996] ECR I-1029. par. 
40. 
22  Case 28-30/62. Da Costa en .Schaake NV, Jacob Meijer NV, Hoechst-Holland NV v 
Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration. [1963] ECR 0061. 
23  Case 283/81. SrI CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health. [1982] ECR 
3415. par. 13. Confirmed in Case C-337/95. Parfums Christian Dior SA and Parfums Christian 
Dior BV v Evora BV. [ 1997] ECR 6013. par. 29. 
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relation to compulsory reference. In this case the Court specified the conditions 
of the legal effect described in the Da Costa case. 
At the same time in the CILFIT case the Court extended the range of cases 
in which compulsory reference loses its purpose in consequence of the previous 
decision of the Court on the same legal question. The following statement made 
in the case on the one hand attributes such a legal effect to decisions reached in 
another procedure, and on the other hand such a legal effect is attributed to 
decisions in which the arising legal question is not strictly identical to the legal 
question constituting the subject of the future reference: 
"The same effect, as regards the limits set to the obligation laid down by 
the third paragraph of I{rticle [234], may be produced where previous 
decisions of the Court have already dealt with the point of law in 
question, irrespective of the nature of the proceedings which led to those 
decisions, even though the questions at issue are not strictly identical. "24 
Thus a legal effect is attributed by the Court not only to preliminary rulings 
raising a "materially identical" legal question but also to preliminary rulings 
raising a "not strictly identical" legal question. (It must be pointed out here that 
the Court never failed to emphasize that the national court will retain its right to 
refer in such cases, too, only its duty to refer will cease as a result of a previous 
preliminary ruling with an identical subject.) 
The normative force of preliminary rulings can be deduced from section 3 of 
Article 104 of the Procedural Rules of the Court, according to which the Court 
can decide in the preliminary ruling procedure not by judgment but by reasoned 
order when "a question referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling is 
identical to a question on which the Court has already ruled, where the answer 
to such a question may be clearly deduced from existing case law or where the 
answer to the question admits of no reasonable doubt". 
At the same time it has to be remarked that in addition to these statements 
the legal practice of the Court also includes terms which seem to contradict the 
objective nature of preliminary ruling. For example, in addition to ascertaining 
the binding force of preliminary ruling, the Court declared in the Wünsche case 
that (italics by the author): 
"It follows that a judgment in which the Court gives a preliminary ruling 
on the interpretation or validity of an act of a Community institution 
conclusively determines a question or questions of Community law and 
is binding on the national court for the purposes of the decision to be 
given by it in the main proceedings. "25 
24 Case 283/81. SrI CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health. [1982] ECR 
3415. par. 14. 
25  Case 69/85. Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft GmbH & Co. v Germany. [1986] ECR 0947. 
par. 13. 
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I do not think, however, that such an assertion would invalidate the statements 
the Court of Justice has regularly made since the Da Costa case. Although it is 
obvious from the above practice of the Court that preliminary rulings have 
some force on the courts proceeding in other cases, the nature of this legal 
effect has remained open. 
Is it compulsory to follow preliminary rulings on interpretation? 
As concerns the content of the legal effect, the vital question is whether the 
national court has to follow the preliminary ruling made in another, similar case 
or it may diverge from it. After all the European Court of Justice does not give 
a definite answer to this. In my opinion, however, sustainable conclusions can 
be drawn concerning this issue based on the legal practice of the Court and on 
the arguments set forth in literature. 
As a starting point, I regard one of the assertions of the Court very 
important. Here the general effect of preliminary rulings covering national 
courts was traced back to higher principles, and at the same time this statement 
can indirectly constitute the grounds for opinions in favour of the binding force 
of such decisions: 
"Article [234] is essential for the preservation of the Community 
character of the law established by the Treaty and has the object of 
ensuring that in all circumstances this law is the same in all states of the 
Community. Whilst it thus aims to avoid divergences in the interpretation 
of Community law which the national courts have to apply, it likewise 
tends to ensure this application by making available to the national judge 
a means of eliminating difficulties which may be occasioned by the 
requirement of giving Community law its full effect within the 
framework of the judicial systems of the Member States. Consequently 
any gap in the system so organized could undermine the effectiveness of 
the provisions of the Treaty and of the secondary  law. The 
provisions of Article [234], which enable every national court or tribunal 
without distinction to refer a case to the Court for a preliminary ruling 
when it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it 
to give a judgment, must be seen in this light. "26 
The reference to higher principles fulfils a major role in cases when the Treaty 
does not regulate a question and the Court has to explore and fit possible 
solutions into the Community legal system according to the generally accepted 
methods of interpretation. An essential form of this is invoking the basic 
26  Case 166/73. Rheinmühlen- Düsseldorf v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und 
Futtermittel [1974] ECR 0033. par. 2. 
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principles of the Community legal system and drawing the conclusions from 
them. 27 
Thus, the above decision has to be considered together with the great 
number of statements in which the Court emphasizes the importance of the 
uniform application of Community law and associates its own task, the function 
of Article 234, with the principle of solidarity and co-operation incorporated in 
Article 10 of the EC Treaty. 
In accordance with Article 220 of the EC Treaty the task of the Court is to 
ensure that the Community law is observed in the interpretation and application 
of the Treaty. 28 In several of its decisions the Court set forth the fundamental 
requirement of the uniform application of Community law in the Member 
States - in association with legal certainty, too - without which Community 
law cannot fulfil its purposes appropriately. 29 For example, this was referred to 
by the Court when it concluded that state responsibility for violating 
Community law at the expense of a private party cannot be based exclusively 
on legal rules of the Member State containing different solutions. 30 Anyway, the 
most important function of Article 234 of the EC Treaty is to ensure the 
uniform application of Community law in the Member States. 31 This is also 
confirmed by the fact that according to Article 10 of the EC Treaty the 
obligation of solidarity and co-operation to be applied to the Member States 
generally - among others in order to protect the rights of individuals - also 
27  Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93. Brasserie du Pecheur SA v Germany and The Queen v. 
Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd. and others. [1996] ECR 1-1029. par. 
27., see also the opinion of AG Cosmas in Joined Cases 94-95/95. Danila Bonifaci and others and 
Wanda Berto and others v Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS). [1997] ECR 1-3969. 
per AG Cosmas par. 43. 
28 E.g. Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93. Brasserie du Pecheur SA v Germany and The 
Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd. and others. [1996] ECR í-
1029. par. 27. 
29  Case 9/65. Acciaierie San Michele SpA f.a. v High Authority of the ECSC. [1967] ECR 
0035., Case 26/66. • Koninklijke Nederlandsche Hoogovens en Staalfabrieken NV v High 
Authority of the ECSC. [1967] ECR 0149., Case 106/77. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello 
Stato v Simmenthal SpA. [1978] ECR 0629. par. 14., Joined Cases C-143/88 and C-92/89. 
Zuckerfabrik Silderdithmarschen AG v Hauptzollamt Itzehoe and Zuckerfabrik Soest GmbH v 
Hauptzollamt Paderborn. [1991] ECR 0415. par. 26. 
° Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93. Brasserie du Pecheur SA v Germany and The Queen v. 
Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd. and others. [1996] ECR I-1029. par. 
33. 
3' Case 112/83. Société des produits de mats SA v Administration des douanes et droits 
indirects. [1985] ECR 0719., par. 17., Case 33/84. SpA Fragd v Amministrazione delle finanze 
dello Stato. [1985] ECR 1605. par. 17., Case C-228/92. Roquette Fréres SA v Hauptzollamt 
Geldern. [1994] ECR 1445. par. 20., Case 96/71. R. & V. Haegeman v Commission. [1972] ECR 
1005. par. 8., Case C-192/89. S. Z. Sevince v Staatssecretaris van Justitie. [1990] ECR 3461. par. 
11., Case T-5/93. Roger Tremblay, Francois Lucazeau and Harry Kestenberg v Commission. 
[1995] ECR 0185. par. 81. 
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applies to the procedure of national courts. 32 Similarly, a fundamental 
requirement of Community legal order is the full and efficient enforcement of 
Community law and the efficient protection of rights provided in it." 
In other cases these higher principles served as the basis for the Court to 
make statements and decisions in questions of constitutional importance of the 
Community legal system (e.g. the priority of Community law, the direct effect 
of Community law). Consequently, they are suitable for constituting the 
grounds of conclusions according to which the preliminary rulings of 
Community courts are generally binding on national courts. Such a solution 
would ensue from the requirement of the efficient enforcement and uniform 
application of Community law, which would be supported by the obligation of 
solidarity and co-operation also imposed on the activity of national courts. 
There were two cases in which the Court claimed that all in all its 
interpretation becomes part of Community law: 
"The interpretation which, in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred 
upon it by Article [234], the Court of Justice gives to a rule of 
Community law clarifies and defines where necessary the meaning and 
scope of that rules as it must be or ought to have been understood and 
applied from the time of its coming into force. It follows that the rule as 
thus interpreted must be applied by the courts even to legal relationships 
arising and established before the ruling on the request for interpretation, 
provided that in other respects the conditions enabling an action relating 
to the application of that rule to be brought before the courts having 
jurisdiction are satisfied. "34 
The temporal effect can be limited by the Court in matters of interpretation in 
preliminary rulings only in an individual case, on the bases of special reasons, 
at the same time following the principle of legal certainty. The fact that the 
32  Case 33/76. Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG et Rewe-Zentral AG v Landwirtschaftskammer fúr das 
Saarland. [1976] ECR 1989. par. 5., Case C-106/89. Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional 
de Alimentacion SA. [1990] ECR 4135. par. 8., Case C-213/89. The Queen v Secretary of State 
for Transport, ex pane: Factortame Ltd. and others. [1990] ECR I-2433. par. 19., Joines Cases C-
6/90 and C-9/90. Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and others v Italy. [1991] ECR 1-5357. 
par.36. 
33  Case 106/77. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA. [1978] ECR 
0629. paras. 18-21., Case C-213/89. The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex pane: 
Factortame Ltd. and others. [1990] ECR 1-2433. par. 20., Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93. 
Brasserie du Pecheur SA v Germany and The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex pane: 
Factortame Ltd. and others. [1996] ECR I-1029. par 39., Joined Cases C-143/88 and C-92/89. 
Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen AG v Hauptzollamt Itzehoe and Zuckerfabrik Soest GmbH v 
Hauptzollamt Paderborn. [1991] ECR 0415. par. 30., Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90. Andrea 
Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and others v Italy. [1991] ECR 1-5357. paras.32-33. 
34  Case 811/79. Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato v Ariete SpA. [1980] ECR 2545. 
par. 6., likewise 826/79. Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato v Sas Mediterranea 
importazione, rappresentanze, esportazione, commercio (MIRECO). [ 1980] ECR 2559. par. 7. 
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interpretation becomes part of law and is to be applied together with it is an 
essential aspect in considering the general, binding force of preliminary rulings. 
Once again, it follows directly from this opinion of the Court that the decision 
in preliminary rulings has to be followed by national courts. 
The two judgments, in which this statement appears, were promulgated on 
the same day by the same chamber of the Court. This statement is not referred 
to later, which may weaken the validity of the statement and may raise the 
question to what extent this statement is valid. The Court of First Instance has a 
statement which attributes an objective nature to preliminary ruling: according 
to this preliminary ruling "states the law".35 This suggests that the interpretation 
given in preliminary rulings becomes part of the law and as such it is generally 
binding. 
Several Advocates General worded the opinion that preliminary rulings may 
actually be binding on national courts proceeding in other cases. 36 In literature 
the obvious majority considers it a fact that preliminary rulings have to be 
followed by national courts proceeding in other cases — or, in the absence of 
this, they have to refer the case to the Court of Justice. 37 
However, binding force does not restrict the national courts' right to refer 
even in legal questions already decided. Going back to the statement made in 
the Da Costa case, preliminary ruling made in an identical legal question 
renders the national courts' duty to refer formal, it is deprived of its content. A 
previous decision can have such an effect only because it dispels the doubts of 
the national court as concerns the answer to be given to a legal question 
ensuing from Community law. However, this postulates a decision on the part 
of the national court which is in harmony with the decision of the Court and 
does not differ from it. If the opinion of the national court is different from the 
preliminary ruling previously made in a similar case, this can hardly be without 
reasonable doubt in view of the contrary opinion of Community courts. This is 
when the duty or possibility to refer is considered. 
The Court did not give the slightest indication of wanting to restrict the 
national courts' right to refer for the reason that Community courts had already 
made a decision in a certain legal question. The court statements quoted above 
35  Case T-83/96. Gerard van der Wal v Commission. [1998] ECR I1-0545. par. 37. 
36  Case C-145/88. Torfaen Borough Council v B & Q plc. [1989] ECR 3851. per AG Van 
Gerven par. 8., Case 103/88. Fratelli Costanzo SpA v Comune di Milano. [1989] ECR 1839. per 
AG Lenz par. 39., Case 228/92. Roquette Fréres SA v Hauptzollamt Geldem. [1994] ECR I-
1445. per AG Darmon par. 14. 
37 BROWN, L.N. — KENNEDY, T.: The Court of Justice of the European Communities. London 
2000. p. 378., KENT, P.: Law of the European Union. Harlow 2001. p. 113., COMBREXELLE, J. D.: 
L'impact de l'arret de la Cour; étendues et limites des pouvoirs de juge national. In: Evolution 
récente du droit communautaire. Maastricht 1995. Vol. I. p. 115., WATHELET — VAN 
RAEPENBUSCH: 12. p., SCHOCKWEILER, F.: Le renvoi préjudiciel au sens de !'article 177 du Traité 
CEE. In: Bulletin du Cercle Francois Laurent IV. 1992. p. 35., but Hartley is more cautious, see 
HARTLEY, T.C.: The Foundations of European Community Law. Oxford 1994. p. 313. 
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(also with respect to preliminary ruling in a question of invalidity) and the great 
number of other statements always emphasize the right of national courts to 
refer. 
All this means that in the case of preliminary rulings the Court does not 
necessarily assume unconditional binding force. Thus the national court does 
not necessarily have to follow a preliminary ruling made in another case, its 
right to refer is maintained in this case, too. The maintaining of the right to 
refer serves another purpose: it prevents Community law from becoming rigid, 
and under new circumstances the European Court of Justice is given the 
possibility to adjust the interpretation of Community law to the new 
circumstances.'$ 
Shamefaced system of precedent and its causes 
Based on the above it may seem that there is no obstacle to the Court declaring 
the general binding force of preliminary rulings. However, such a dictum would 
raise serious problems. There is no system of precedent in the legal system of 
the majority of Member States, thus there are no methods for the uniform 
interpretation of the binding preliminary ruling of another court. This would 
lead to a very mixed practice as on account of the different methods or 
individual solutions preliminary rulings would not be followed in a uniform 
manner. 39 
If the binding force of a decision made in another case was prescribed, it 
would result in immediate uncertainty at least concerning what this binding 
force means. Which part of the preliminary ruling is binding — the operative 
part or the reasoning as well? Under what conditions is the national court 
obliged to apply the preliminary ruling made in a different case, especially if it 
is closely connected to the facts of the given case? When can the national court 
diverge from the preliminary ruling for the reason that other facts have come to 
light in the concrete case, that is what are the grounds of distinction of the 
cases? 
Declaring the binding force of preliminary ruling would formulate a 
concrete legal obligation on national courts. (Although this legal obligation lies 
hidden in the fundamental principles of Community legal order, it is not 
worded concretely — at least not in this respect.) However, preliminary ruling 
on interpretation as a rule-forming act might necessitate interpretation itself — 
especially in the light of the different factual background of another case. This 
38 OJANEN, T.: Between Precedent and the Present. Turku Law Journal Vol. 3 2001/1. 
pp.112-115., WATHELET - VAN RAEPENBUSCH: 12. p. 
39 ANDERSON, D.W.K. — DEMETRIOU, M.: References to the European Court. London 2002. p. 
337. 
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gives room for the national court with respect to following preliminary ruling 
and to its extent. If there are no uniform methods and procedural rules for 
following a decision of a Community court, in many cases it would be hard — 
due to the uncertainties of interpretation — to state whether the national court 
has followed the relevant preliminary ruling in a given case or not. Thus in 
many cases the requirement of following a preliminary ruling on interpretation 
would necessarily be soft obligation. 
A possible strategy to surmount these obstacles could be to dispense with 
the wording of concrete obligations as regards binding force. Instead, the Court 
may use soft concepts or references which are suitable for founding or outlining 
such an obligation without its concrete formulation. Such could be for example 
that national courts "take into attention" or "respect" preliminary rulings. 40 
Then the practice of the Member States can form the conditions of applying 
these soft requirements. When the conscious practice and methods of following 
preliminary rulings are formed in the judicial practice of the Member States, it 
is time to definitely formulate the obligation. 
Community courts are not bound by their previous decisions. At the same 
time the courts cannot disregard their previous decisions. The chain of 
judgments should be unbroken and consistent when the facts of the case are 
similar. The lack of similar judgments in similar cases would undermine legal 
certainty and would question confidence in courts. Every court strives to build 
up coherent case law with the smallest number of breaks possible, and to define 
and reason such breaks appropriately. This, however, has led to a rather 
schizophrenic situation. Thus Community courts "rely on their previous 
decisions" but they are not obliged to do so. A "shamefaced system of 
precedent" has evolved. 
40 See e.g. Case C-465/93. Atlanta Fruchthandellsgesellschaft mbh and others v Bundesamt 
Fuerernaehrung und Forstwirtschaft. [ 1995] ECR 3761. par. 46. 
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AZ EURÓPAI BÍRÓSÁG: SZÉGYENLŐS PRECEDENSJOG? 
(Összefoglalás) 
Igen vitato tt kérdés, hogy az Európai Bíróság jogértelmezést tartalmazó 
előzetes döntései' mennyiben kötelezőek az előterjesztésre okot adó ügyön túl. 
A tanulmány arra keres választ, hogy a közösségi bíróságok a joggyakorla-
tukban mennyiben tekintik általánosan kötelezőnek ezeket az ítéleteket. A 
szerző számbaveszi a különböző érveket, és következtetése szerint jóval több 
érv szól az általánosan kötelező jelleg melle tt, mint ellene. 
Ugyanakkor-a közösségi bíróságokat formálisan nem kötik a megelőző 
döntéseik. Azonban a bíróságok nem tehetik meg, hogy nincsnek figyelemmel 
megelőző döntéseikre. Az ítélkezés láncolatának következetesnek, töretlennek 
kell lennie hasonló tényállások melle tt. A közösségi bíróságok természetes 
módon törekszenek olyan összefüggő esetjogot felépíteni, melyben minél 
kevesebb törés van, és az ilyen töréseket megfelelően elhatárolni és indokolni. 
Így a közösségi bíróságok ugyan „támaszkodnak megelőző döntéseikre", de erre 
nem kötelesek. Kialakult a „szégyenlős precedensjog". 
